Over the past 20 years, demand for acute care hospital services has declined more rapidly than has hospital capacity. This paper investigates the extent to which the preponderance of the nonprofit form in this industry might account for this phenomenon. We test whether rates of exit from the hospital industry differ significantly across the different forms of ownership, and especially whether secular nonprofit hospitals reduce capacity more slowly than do other types of hospitals. We estimate the effect of population changes (a proxy for changes in demand) at the zip-code level between 1985 and 1994 on changes in the capacity of for-profit, secular nonprofit, religious nonprofit, and public hospitals over the same period, holding constant metropolitan statistical area (MSA) fixed effects and other 1985 baseline characteristics of residential zip codes. We find that for-profit hospitals are the most responsive to reductions in demand, followed in turn by public and religiously affiliated nonprofit hospitals, while secular nonprofits are distinctly the least responsive of the four ownership types.
INTRODUCTION
Hospital care is the most prominent of several important service industries -concentrated heavily in health care, education, and the arts -in which nonprofit firms account for a substantial share of total production. Nonprofit firms do not, however, provide all of the nation's hospital care; the industry is also heavily populated with both for-profit and governmental firms. The mix of ownership forms in this industry has fed a long-standing debate among economists, sociologists, and legal scholars about the patient and social welfare implications of ownership, with particular attention to differences between nonprofit and for-profit institutions. In this vein, several studies (reviewed in Kessler and McClellan 2002) have examined the effects of ownership on quality of care, operating efficiency, prices, costs, and the volume of charity care.
We explore here a different but related issue: the effects of ownership on the rapidity of exit in the face of declining demand.
In recent years, hospital care in the U.S. has been characterized by rapidly falling demand, likely due in large part to technological advances in medical procedures and to managed care (Cutler 2000) . Between 1980 and 1999, inpatient non-federal days in short-stay hospitals in the U.S. fell from 293,830,162 to 160,560,460, or 45.4 Tables 1 and 91) . Capacity, however, has declined significantly less rapidly. The number of non-federal hospital beds fell from 1,247,188 to 938,746 over this period, or 24.7 percent (Health United States 2001, Table 108 ).
percent (Health United States 2001,
The preponderance of the nonprofit form in the hospital industry may largely explain this divergence between the rate of decline in demand and the rate of contraction of capacity. The managers of nonprofit hospitals, lacking a class of owners to whom they are accountable, face no external pressure to maximize profits, or even (like a public utility) to produce at least a market rate of return on the firm's invested capital. Rather, when cash flow is positive, they are free to reinvest all of it, expanding capacity to the point where net revenues (and hence the marginal rate of return on existing investments) is zero. And, even if cash flow is negative, they are free to maintain capacity by drawing down on accumulated net assets (which, among nonprofit hospitals, are often substantial). Indeed, managers of nonprofit hospitals may even feel it is their duty to behave in this fashion, believing in good faith that all of the firm's revenues and net assets must be dedicated to providing the maximum amount of hospital care possible.
A natural and potentially more efficient alternative would be for the hospital to return its (potential) free cash flow, beyond what can be reinvested with an appropriately high social rate of return, to patients in the form of lower prices. But for hospital managers this alternative is rendered even less morally salient than it might otherwise be by the fact that the bulk of hospital revenue today comes, not directly from patients, but rather from third-party insurers. (Another alternative would be to donate net revenues or assets to other charities with greater social need, as is sometimes done with the proceeds from conversion from nonprofit to for-profit form.)
Reluctance to reduce capacity is likely to be strongly reinforced, moreover, by pressure from a hospital's affiliated staff physicians, whose income may be threatened by reduction or elimination of the hospitals' facilities (Pauly and Redish 1974) .
To be sure, the managers of for-profit firms, and particularly of broadly-held business corporations, also have at times both the incentive and the opportunity to engage in empirebuilding. But the market for corporate control acts as an ultimate check on such tendencies, as demonstrated by the numerous hostile takeovers of the 1980s, which were in part directed at reducing overcapacity and excessive reinvestment (Jensen 1988) . No similar check exists for nonprofit firms, which cannot be the subject of a hostile takeover.
It follows that a nonprofit firm not only can, but might well be expected to, maintain capacity and even expand in circumstances where its for-profit competitors choose to contract or exit the market entirely. And this can remain true even if for-profit firms are significantly more cost efficient, and even if the nonprofit firm receives no special subsidies (Hansmann, 1996a) . In short, nonprofit firms have a tendency to act as capital traps, in which capital remains inefficiently embedded over long periods.
The social welfare implications of such behavior are theoretically indeterminate. On one hand, "slow" adjustment of capacity to demand may be optimal. Altering the level of a factor of production whose costs are as sunk as those of a hospital bed is socially costly. On the other hand, "slow" adjustment may be socially wasteful. Maintaining a hospital bed is costly, in both financial and nonfinancial terms. Substantial research, starting with Roemer (1961) , has suggested that high levels of bed capacity per patient lead to longer lengths of stay and higher costs. More recent research indicates that hospitals that treat relatively few cases of any particular type of patient -a potential consequence of high capacity -may deliver lower-quality care. Kessler and McClellan (2000) , for example, find that elderly heart attack patients from markets with high levels of capacity per unit cardiac patient experience both generally higher levels of Medicare expenditures and higher mortality rates (although somewhat lower rates of cardiac complications).
Thus, it is important to understand how ownership affects capacity choice. If ownership forms respond differently to changes in demand, then public policies that favor one ownership form over another may affect welfare not just by altering the mix of ownership forms itself, but also by affecting the aggregate level of industry capacity. Moreover, identifying differences in the response of capacity to demand by ownership type can help distinguish among competing general models of nonprofit firm behavior.
Despite the importance of the subject, however, little empirical work has focused on the impact of ownership form on capacity choice. Two studies have examined the differential supply response of nonprofit and for-profit firms, and of hospitals in particular, to rapid increases in demand. Both studies found that the market share of for-profit as opposed to nonprofit firms was significantly higher in areas that had recently experienced rapid growth in population. (Steinwald and Neuhauser 1970; Hansmann 1987.) These studies concluded that this pattern is explained, in important part, by the difficulties that nonprofit firms face in obtaining rapid access to capital.
1 The long-term pattern of development in the hospital industry, prior to the implementation of Medicare and Medicaid in 1966, was that the ratio of for-profit to nonprofit firms increased during periods of rapidly increasing demand, and then fell --owing, in part, to conversions from for-profit to nonprofit form --as demand growth slackened (Steinwald and Neuhauser 1970) . The sluggish nonprofit supply response to increasing demand was thus largely a short-term phenomenon.
The principal problem facing the hospital industry today, however, may not be to hasten capacity expansion to meet growing demand, but just the opposite: to hasten the elimination of excess capacity already in place. Moreover, the problem is not peculiar to the hospital industry.
The nonprofit form frequently performs a transitional role in the early stages of a service industry's development, serving as an important source of production until adequate demand-side financing is organized, and the service is sufficiently standardized or regulated, to permit for-profit firms to serve as efficient providers. After that, the nonprofit firms lose their special raison d'etre, yet retain a substantial market share owing to trapped capital. Savings banking is a conspicuous example from the past (Hansmann, 1996b) ; health insurance and health maintenance organizations are contemporary examples; and higher education may be an example in the future (Hansmann 1996a) . The problem of trapped capital is generic in the nonprofit sector.
We have spoken so far of the effects of nonprofit versus for-profit ownership on the rate of capacity adjustment, but the underlying model of behavior described above can explain other differences in capacity choice between ownership forms. Hospital care, like some other important services such as education, is also provided in substantial part by governmental institutions. Supply response in general, and trapped capital in particular, may be less of a problem for these public firms than it is for nonprofit firms. A public hospital is not a nonprofit entity, but rather a proprietary entity, with the government as the owner. And the government has other pressing uses for its funds besides providing hospital care. Consequently, when the private sector becomes capable of providing services formerly provided by the government, governments may face political incentives to exit. Consistent with this logic, after Medicare and Medicaid relieved much of the need for public and nonprofit hospitals to provide uncompensated care, there was substantial exit by public institutions, whose share of total beds dropped from roughly 31% to 24% between 1971 and 1992, while for-profit hospitals simultaneously increased their market share from 6% to 12%. In striking comparison, nonprofit hospitals, rather than exiting in large numbers like the public institutions, actually increased their market share slightly during that period, from 63% to 64%. (Hansmann 1996a.) For similar reasons, one might expect nonprofit hospitals to differ among themselves in terms of supply response. The most conspicuous divide in this respect is between religiouslyaffiliated and nonreligious hospitals. Like public hospitals, religiously-affiliated hospitals often have an owner of sorts, if not in the formal legal sense then at least in the functional sense that they are commonly associated with another entity, the church, that both exercises substantial control over them and stands to benefit from economies achieved in the hospitals' operations (and can serve as a source of funds and act as entrepreneur when expansion or entry is called for). By this reasoning, religiously-affiliated hospitals would show greater supply response than non-religious nonprofit hospitals.
In this paper we seek to test whether rates of exit from the hospital industry differ significantly across the different forms of ownership, and especially whether secular nonprofit hospitals, which supply the majority of industry capacity, are much slower to reduce capacity than are other types of hospitals. We examine the relative responsiveness of the different types of hospitals to changes in demand for hospital services, using changes in the size of the elderly population as a proxy for changes in demand. We present estimates of the effect of population changes at the zip-code level between 1985 and 1994 on changes in the capacity of for-profit, secular nonprofit, religious nonprofit, and public hospitals over the same period, holding constant metropolitan statistical area (MSA) fixed effects and other 1985 baseline characteristics of residential zip codes. We decompose the effect on each ownership form's capacity of population into four mutually exclusive and exhaustive sources: changes due to opens and closes of hospitals, changes due to conversions, changes due to mergers and spinoffs, and changes due to changes in hospitals' bed size. We also investigate whether the responsiveness of different ownership forms' capacity to population differ according to zip codes' baseline 1985 hospital market characteristics.
Sections II through IV present the statistical models, the sources of data, and the empirical results. Section V concludes with some observations about the implications of our results for the hypothesized model of nonprofit firms' behavior described above, and for economic efficiency in sectors dominated by nonprofit firms.
II. MODELS
For every residential zip code z = 1, …, Z in a MSA in 1985 and 1994, we construct a measure of the hospital capacity serving that zip code. We assume that z is served by every nonfederal, general medical /surgical hospital j = 1, …, J z within 35 miles of the patient's residence with at least five heart attack (AMI) admissions, and every large, nonfederal, general medical/surgical teaching hospital within 100 miles of the patient's residence with at least five AMI admissions. 2 We allocate a hospital's beds B j to z in inverse proportion to the distance between the hospital and the center of z, such that the capacity of z in 1985 is defined as
where D jz is the distance from j to z for every z = 1, …, Z j that is served by j. We define C z,94
analogously, and the log growth of capacity in zip code z as dlnC z = ln(C z,94 ) -ln (C z,85 Then, recalculate each area's capacity and change in capacity using these counterfactual hospital capacities.
We model area changes in capacity as a function of 1985-1994 changes in a zip code's Medicare enrollee population (to proxy for changes in demand for hospital services), the 1985 demographic characteristics of each zip code, the 1985 hospital market characteristics of each zip code, and MSA fixed effects. Thus, our effects are identified from within-MSA changes in population and within-MSA differences in market characteristics. We allow hospital capacity to respond asymmetrically to population increases and decreases. Our basic models specify the log change in residential zip code z's capacity of ownership form k as a linear function of these factors:
where α k is an MSA-specific constant term; dlnP z + is z's log change in population if z's population expanded, 0 otherwise; dlnP z -is z's log change in population if z's population contracted, 0 otherwise; X z is a vector of six variables denoting the proportion of z's population in 1985 who were female, black, age 70-74, age 75-79, age 80-89, and age 90-99 (omitted group is the proportion of population that were white males aged 65-69); M z is a vector of six variables denoting whether z in 1985 was in a highly-concentrated hospital market (in the top quartile of the distribution of Hirschman-Herfindahl indices), and whether z in 1985 had above the median density of patients admitted to large hospitals, teaching hospitals, hospitals that were members of multi-hospital systems, for-profit versus nonprofit hospitals, and public versus nonprofit hospitals; 3 and ε z is an independently-distributed error term, with E(ε z | dlnP z , X z , M z ) = 0. We weight each observation by the number of beds of ownership type k in zip code z, C z k .
We reestimate model (1) including controls for baseline 1985 beds per capita as a control variable, to investigate the extent to which our results are sensitive to differences in baseline capacity that are correlated with ownership status across areas:
We also estimate two expanded models to investigate whether the responsiveness of capacity to population shifts varies by 1985 baseline characteristics of hospital markets. First, we estimate models that interact lnC z with dlnP, to investigate the extent to which capacity is differentially responsive to demand in high-versus low-capacity areas:
Second, we estimate models that interact M z with dlnP z :
Estimates from this model will show, for example, the extent to which capacity of different ownership forms respond differently to demand in more versus less competitive markets.
III. DATA
We use data from four sources. First, we use data on U.S. hospital characteristics collected by the American Hospital Association (AHA). The response rate of hospitals to the AHA survey is greater than 90 percent, with response rates above 95 percent for large hospitals (>300 beds). We exclude rural hospitals and hospitals owned by the federal government (primarily Veterans' Administration hospitals) because the process governing capacity decisions for these hospitals may differ from other hospitals. We analyze the capacity of only those hospitals that ever reported providing general medical or surgical services (for example, we exclude psychiatric and rehabilitation hospitals from analysis). To assess hospital size and bed capacity per patient, we use total general medical/surgical beds, including ICU/CCU and emergency beds. We classify hospitals as teaching hospitals if they report at least 20 full-time residents.
Second, we use a hospital system database constructed from multiple sources (see Madison 2001 for a detailed discussion). The AHA survey contains extensive year-by-year information on hospital system membership status. Our validity checking indicated that the universe of systems and system hospitals, and the timing of hospitals' system membership, as defined by AHA did not conform to discussion of hospital systems in the trade press such as Modern Healthcare. We therefore created our own system database based on a combination of the AHA and other sources. We classify hospitals as for-profit, secular nonprofit, religious nonprofit, or publicly-owned. We classify all public hospitals as non-system hospitals because system membership of public hospitals in our data did not reflect reliably actual transfer of control to an outside entity. In percentage terms, religious nonprofit hospitals experienced the greatest contraction in bed capacity (32.5 percent), with public hospitals close behind (29.6 percent). For-profit beds contracted by 21.4 percent, while nonreligious nonprofit beds contracted the least, by 20 percent.
These simple percentages do not give a clear picture of relative supply response, however, because the environments in which these four forms of ownership are found tend to differ. In particular, at the beginning of the study period, nonprofit hospitals, in comparison with for-profit hospitals, tended to be concentrated in areas with unusually high levels of capacity, where the need for reduction in capacity was presumably greatest. In results not presented in Table 1 In recent years, much attention has been focused on conversions of nonprofit hospitals to for-profit form -attention that has been due, in part, to concerns about private profiteering that accompanying some of these conversions (see, e.g., Sloan, Taylor, and Conover 2000) . Table 1 suggests that the pattern of conversion activity is not well described, however, as an overall shift of capacity from nonprofit to for-profit form. Rather, Table 1 shows that conversions were in fact a net source of increase in secular nonprofit hospital beds between 1985 and 1994, and it further shows that, in aggregate, net conversion activity in that period was out of both public and religious nonprofit hospitals and into both for-profit and secular nonprofit hospitals.
To provide a more refined view of conversion activity, Table 2 tabulates the conversions in our data according to the ownership status of the hospitals involved both before and after the conversion. Those data show that, while there is a substantial number of conversions directly from secular nonprofit to for-profit form, there are also nearly two-thirds as many conversions in the reverse direction -likely as a response to declining profitability. The principal net conversion activity across ownership forms is, instead, from public hospitals to secular nonprofit hospitals, which accounts for nearly all of the overall net increase in secular nonprofit hospitals through conversion during the period in question.
4 Table 3 shows how residential zip codes' hospital capacity responds to changes in population, according to the size of the zip codes' MSA, and previews the results of our regression models. The rates of capacity change in the most-populous and least-populous MSA quartiles present a more complex pattern. In particular, Table 3 shows that, among the most populous MSAs, for-profit hospitals exited the faster-growing MSAs at a slightly faster rate than they The fact that the response to changing demand of hospitals of different ownership types differs depending on the characteristics of the cities in which they are located motivates our regression models. Those models identify the effects of changing demand on capacity based on within-MSA variation in population rather than on variation across MSAs, to control for such unobserved differences in hospitals' strategies. Specifically, we estimate the effect, on zip-code level measures of changes in capacity, of zip-code changes in demand and zip-code hospital market characteristics, holding constant MSA fixed effects. Descriptive statistics of all of the variables used in the regression analysis appear in Table 4 . Table 5 presents estimates of the effect of population changes and base year hospital market characteristics on changes in differently-owned forms of hospital capacity from model
IV. RESULTS
(1). For hospitals overall, and for each individual ownership type, responsiveness to increases in demand, as proxied by population increases, is lower than responsiveness to decreases in demand, controlling for other market characteristics. A one percent increase in population leads to a .017 percent increase in overall capacity, holding other factors constant, while a one percent population decrease leads to a .095 percent decrease in overall capacity. This is what one would expect in an industry generally characterized by overcapacity.
Comparing the second through fifth columns of the first row of Table 5 shows that responsiveness to increases in demand for secular nonprofits is similar to that for religious nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, and rather lower than that of public institutions. This is perhaps because the expansionary incentives facing (the managers of) secular nonprofits, which -as we have suggested above -are arguably greater than those present in the other three ownership types, are counterbalanced by the greater difficulty that secular nonprofits face in obtaining rapid access to capital.
Of primary interest to us here, however, is the relative responsiveness to decreases in demand exhibited by hospitals under different forms of ownership. Here, the results in Table 5 follow precisely the pattern that our theoretical discussion would predict. For-profit capacity is most responsive to decreases in demand. Next most responsive are public capacity and religious nonprofit capacity, for which the estimated coefficients are nearly identical. Secular nonprofit capacity is distinctly the least responsive to decreases in demand, with a coefficient that is less than half the coefficient for public and religious nonprofit capacity, and only one third of the coefficient for the responsiveness of for-profit capacity.
Tables 6 and 7 present estimates of models (2) and (3), respectively. Estimates of model (2) from Table 6 differ from the estimates of model (1) from Table 5 in that the former are calculated controlling baseline (1985) total hospital capacity per elderly Medicare beneficiary.
Estimates of model (3) from Table 7 differ from the estimates of model (1) in Table 5 in that the former are calculated controlling for baseline hospital capacity plus baseline capacity interacted with the two population change variables, producing estimates of the effect of demand responsiveness that vary with the level of baseline capacity. Table 6 shows that, especially for both forms of nonprofit capacity, the estimated responsiveness of capacity to increases in population grows larger once baseline capacity is held constant. The results are similar for the alternative specification in Table 7 . In both Tables 6 and   7 , this increase in responsiveness is offset by a significant negative effect of high baseline capacity on the rate of growth in capacity. These are the results one would expect: there is less need to expand capacity to meet growing demand when the capacity in place is already unusually large.
The estimated responsiveness of capacity to population decreases remains essentially unchanged from Table 5 to Table 6 for all forms of ownership, even though baseline capacity is statistically significantly correlated with population decreases, just as it is with population increases (from analysis not in the table, D = .106 and D = -.047, respectively). One possible interpretation is that areas with declining population are already marked by sufficient overcapacity that they are contracting as fast as feasible (given organizational constraints), and that the added stimulus of yet further overcapacity has no important effect on the rate of contraction. In Table 7 , the responsiveness of capacity to decreases in population drops substantially for all ownership types. High-capacity areas are less responsive to decreases in demand than are low-capacity areas, likely due to the same factors -not captured in these models -that were responsible for the high capacity to begin with. Table 9 gives results for hospital capacity in aggregate. The exhaustive/exclusive nature of the decomposition is reflected in the fact that the coefficients across columns in Table 9 add to approximately the coefficients in column 1 of Table 2. Tables 10 through 13 give results for each ownership form taken separately. Table 9 indicates that, as means of responding to both increases and decreases in demand, neither conversions nor mergers/spinoffs are significant vehicles for all forms of ownership in aggregate. This is not surprising, since those transactions do not in themselves lead to any change in aggregate capacity, although they can be the occasion for change. More interesting is the result that opens/closes, but not changes in bed size, is a significant means of responding to increases in demand. One reason for this pattern may be that areas with increasing population are often newly developed sections of MSAs that are far from existing facilities, and hence not easily served by expanding those facilities; rather, new facilities must be built to serve those areas. Another reason may be that, with changes in technology, it is often easier to build an entirely new facility than to expand an existing one.
The most surprising result in Table 8 , however, is that only changes in bed size, and not opens/closes, are a significant means of reducing aggregate hospital capacity in response to decreases in demand. This result is due to the fact that (as seen in Tables 9 and 10 ) both secular and religious nonprofit hospitals use reductions in bed capacity much more than closure of facilities to respond to decreasing demand, consistent with the strong managerialist bias against complete exit that theory suggests we would find at least among secular nonprofits.
At first glance, Tables 10-13 appear to suggest that conversions are not used to transform the ownership structure of beds in response to demand changes: rows 1 and 2, column 2 of Tables 10-13 are small and statistically insignificant. However, this may be an artifact of our limited definition of conversion (i.e., same name and AHA identifier in 1985 and 1994, but with a different ownership status), which may exclude some changes in control that were de facto conversions. Tables 10-13 hint that this may be the case. In areas of decreasing population, nonprofit capacity contracts through opens/closes, while for-profit and public hospitals actually expand capacity significantly through opens/closes, suggesting that some of the closes and opens involved may actually be conversions. This finding underscores one potential limitation of the analysis of tables 10-13: any classification of changes in capacities into mutually exclusive categories necessarily involves some arbitrary decisions that may not reflect the complex realities of the changing structure of the hospital industry.
V. CONCLUSION
Numerous empirical studies have sought to identify how differences in the incentives facing managers of nonprofit and for-profit firms lead to differences in economic performance.
7
Many of these studies have taken the hospital industry as their focus. Depending on the dimension of performance examined, these studies have reported both similarities and differences across ownership forms. 8 We have focused here on a largely neglected aspect of performance -rapidity of exit --where differences in behavior between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals seem likely to be unusually pronounced, and where those differences may have important implications for the overall structure and performance of the industry.
Managers of for-profit hospitals, and to a lesser degree also managers of public hospitals and of religiously affiliated nonprofit hospitals, have an incentive to minimize costs of service, and hence to eliminate unused or underused capacity. Managers of unaffiliated nonprofit institutions, in contrast, may not feel such an incentive so long as net cash flow does not become negative. Consequently, it is a plausible hypothesis that nonprofit hospitals adjust capacity much more slowly than do for-profit firms in response to reductions in demand, effectively serving as capital traps.
The results presented here provide strong support for that hypothesis. For-profit hospitals are the most responsive to reductions in demand, followed in turn by public and religiously affiliated nonprofit hospitals, while secular nonprofits are distinctly the least responsive of the four ownership types.
It follows that, if excess capacity is a continuing social problem in the hospital sector, then the high density of nonprofit firms, which are the legacy of a very different era of hospital technology and financing, may be in large part responsible. This suggests, in turn, that encouraging exit by nonprofit institutions -and particularly by secular nonprofits -may enhance efficiency. For example, the withdrawal of federal, state, and local tax exemption from nonprofit hospitals, or at least from those that do not provide substantial amounts of uncompensated care
(much as federal tax exemption was withdrawn from nonprofit health insurance companies in 1986) could lead to a reallocation of assets to more productive uses. Alternatively, facilitating conversion to more cost-sensitive forms of organization by altering the fiduciary duties of nonprofit directors under corporate law to deny them the right to "just say no" to acquisition offers from other firms, and particularly from for-profit firms (Hansmann, 1996a (Hansmann, , 2000 , could accomplish the same goal. The latter reform would restrict the defensive tactics available to the managers of nonprofit corporations even more severely than those available to the managers of business corporations. Given, however, that nonprofit institutions by their nature are relatively insensitive to market pressures for exit, more expansive legally imposed fiduciary duties may be socially optimal. Includes only nonrural, nonfederal hospitals that ever reported providing general medical or surgical services. 1994 total facilities = 1985 total facilities + net change due to opens and closes + net change due to conversions + net change due to mergers and spinoffs. 1985 total facilities = gross losses due to opens and closes + gross losses due to conversions + gross losses due to mergers and spinoffs + facilities experiencing gross gains due to changes in bed size + facilities experiencing gross losses due to changes in bed size + facilities without changes. Notes: Number of zips with nonmissing change in capacity for all ownership types is 12,753, for secular nonprofit is 12,252, for religious nonprofit is 11,010, for for-profit is 6,178, and for public is 10,020. ** denotes statistical significance at a 5 percent level; * denotes statistical significance at a 10 percent level. 
